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Choice blindness refers to the phenomenon that people can be easily misled about the
choices they made in the recent past. The aim of this study was to explore the cognitive
mechanisms underlying choice blindness. Speciﬁcally, we tested whether memory
impairment may account for choice blindness. A total of N = 88 participants provided
sympathy ratings on 10-point scales for 20 female faces. Subsequently, participants
motivated some of their ratings. However, on three trials, they were presented with
sympathy ratings that deviated from their original ratings by three full scale points. On
nearly 41% of the trials, participants failed to detect (i.e., were blind) the manipulation.
After a short interval, participantswere informed that some trials had beenmanipulated and
were asked to recall their original ratings. Participants adopted the manipulated outcome in
only 3% of the trials. Furthermore, the extent to which the original ratings were accurately
remembered was not higher for detected as compared with non-detected trials. From
a theoretical point of view our ﬁndings indicate that memory impairment does not fully
account for blindness phenomena.
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INTRODUCTION
Lay people often think that humans are permanently aware of
the reasons that guide their decisions. In fact the ability to com-
pare the outcome of our choices with our intentions is vital for
adaptive behaviour (Ridderinkhof et al., 2004; Ullsperger and von
Cramon, 2004). Convinced of the rationality of their actions,
people have strong opinions about their preferences and deci-
sions. However, recent ﬁndings indicate that people are poor
at detecting deviations from their choices. More speciﬁcally, a
phenomenon named choice blindness demonstrates that people
often fail to detect a mismatch between their intention and the
later outcome when their choice is surreptitiously manipulated.
In the original demonstration of the phenomenon (Johansson
et al., 2005), participants had to select the more attractive alter-
native out of 15 different pairs of female faces. Subsequently,
they were presented with the chosen alternative and were asked
to explain their judgement. However, for three of these pairs the
researchers, using a magic card trick, swapped the chosen photo
with the alternative non-preferred face. Thus, participants had to
justify a decision they never made. Astonishingly, only 13% of the
manipulated trials were detected immediately at the time of the
manipulation.
The basic phenomenon of choice blindness has been widely
replicated (e.g., Johansson et al., 2008; Hall et al., 2010; Sauerland
et al., 2013a) in different domains that are highly relevant to every-
day decision making, such as consumer preferences (Hall et al.,
2010), moral decision making (Hall et al., 2012), and symptom
reports (e.g., Merckelbach et al., 2011). Choice blindness manipu-
lations have been shown to result in changes of inclination toward
a speciﬁc product and moral attitude, and in symptom escalation.
Yet little is known about the mechanism underlying the choice
blindness phenomenon. Previous studies have successfully ruled
out a number of possible explanations, including poor encoding
of the original (Johansson et al., 2005) or manipulated stim-
uli (Sauerland et al., 2013a), compliance (Johansson et al., 2005,
2008; Sauerland et al., 2013a), suggestibility or the tendency to
react in socially desirable ways (Merckelbach et al., 2011; Sauer-
land et al., 2013a,b). However, none of these studies speciﬁcally
aimed at tackling the cognitive mechanisms underlying the phe-
nomenon. The present work is a ﬁrst, but crucial step to ﬁll in this
gap.
Memory distortion seems intuitively the most plausible candi-
date to explain choice blindness phenomena. Memory distortion is
closely related to the misinformation effect (Loftus and Hoffman,
1989) and hindsight bias (Fischhoff, 1975) and in these domains,
it possesses empirical merits. Interestingly, methods employed to
study the misinformation effect and hindsight bias resemble the
choice blindness paradigm. Speciﬁcally, all three involve exposure
to an original stimulus, the subsequent confrontation with follow-
up information (that may be misleading), and a ﬁnal instruction
that elicits the phenomenon (“Was there a stop sign?”“For which
president candidate did you vote?” or “Why did you ﬁnd this
face the most attractive?”). Thus, all three phenomena can be
conceptualized as forms of memory distortion caused by new
information that inﬂuences a memory trace created earlier. Hence,
it is reasonable to anticipate that the mechanisms underlying these
phenomena share certain commonalities.
To explain misinformation and hindsight bias, researchers
introduced the memory impairment framework (Fischhoff, 1975;
Loftus and Hoffman, 1989). According to this framework, the
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original memory trace is permanently distorted by the presen-
tation of new information by means of alteration, erasure or a
decrease in accessibility of the original memory trace. Accordingly,
exposure to follow-up information can interfere with the recollec-
tion of the original trace, hence resulting in memory impairment.
Extreme positions within this framework hold that the new infor-
mation blends with the existing trace, resulting in an imminent
and persistent alteration of the original trace (immediate assimila-
tion hypothesis; Fischhoff, 1975). More conventional approaches
postulate that the retrieval of separate memory traces depends
on the recency and depth of the encoding (dual memory traces
theory; Hell et al., 1988) or available congruent information (selec-
tive retrieval hypothesis; Slovic and Fischhoff, 1977; Morton et al.,
1985). Nonetheless, all accounts have in common that they view
the interference of the new information as a cause of people’s
inability to recall the original trace (Mazzoni andVannucci, 2007).
Thus, memory deterioration results from the failure to access the
original memory trace.
Although memory deterioration is an intuitively plausible can-
didate to explain choice blindness, to our knowledge, there are
no studies to date that have explicitly tested the memory-choice
blindness link. Indirect evidence for such link comes from a
ﬁeld study (Sagana et al., 2013) that examined choice blindness
for eyewitnesses’ facial recognition decisions. Sagana et al. (2013)
reported that participants who made an accurate lineup decision
were more likely to notice a covertly performed manipulation
at the end of the experiment (i.e., retrospectively) than partic-
ipants who made an erroneous recognition decision. In other
words, participants’ memory, as indicated by recognition accu-
racy, was associated with higher detection rates. Although this
study did not provide a direct test of memory strength, these
ﬁndings are broadly consistent with the idea that memory dete-
rioration is responsible for blindness phenomena. On the other
hand, participants who immediately noticed the change (i.e.,
concurrently) were not more accurate in their lineup decisions
than participants who were blind to the change. This suggests
that the accuracy of a recognition decision and the capacity to
detect a manipulation are not always associated. Thus, Sagana
et al. (2013) concluded that blindness phenomena cannot be fully
attributed to memory decay. The observation that blindness phe-
nomena can be obtained even when the manipulated outcome
is presented minutes after the original choice (Johansson et al.,
2005; Hall et al., 2012) supports this position. Moreover, choice
blindness may occur for stimuli of personal and moral signiﬁ-
cance (Hall et al., 2013; Sauerland et al., 2013b), again suggesting
that memory decay may not be the sole mechanism driving the
effect.
A direct test of whether memory impairment is a prereq-
uisite for in choice blindness phenomena has not been done
to date. This is the aim of the current study. To this end,
we asked participants to rate the sympathy of female faces
and secretly manipulated some of the judgments by increas-
ing or decreasing their ratings. Shortly hereafter, participants
were informed that some trials had been manipulated and
they were asked to recall 50% of the original sympathy rat-
ings they had made earlier. Given the common association
between conﬁdence and accuracy across different domains
(Brewer and Wells, 2006; Rolls et al., 2010; Yeung and Summer-
ﬁeld, 2012), we also asked participants to provide a conﬁdence
rating.
Our research approach allowed us not only to measure mem-
ory strength, but also whether participants could sufﬁciently
disentangle the original choice from the manipulated outcome
once they had been notiﬁed about the manipulations. How-
ever, as we used a relatively short interval between the original
ratings and the instruction to recall, one could argue that this
is a limitation of the current a study. Speciﬁcally, one might
argue that a relatively short interval may be suboptimal for
studying memory corruption. However, given that participants
were asked to recall ten different sympathy ratings of unfamil-
iar faces, we do think that we were able to tap into memory
processes. Conversely, if a longer interval would have been intro-
duced, then our results would run the risk of being burdened
by a disproportionate increase in cognitive load (Klimesch et al.,
1993). Importantly, misleading post-event suggestions can impair
memory with short retention intervals (Belli et al., 1994). A sec-
ond feature of our approach is that, on the second round of
trials, we asked participants to recall their evaluations of the
faces. Asking participants to recall their original ratings may be
problematic, because, instead of recalling their original rating,
participants may simply reevaluate the faces, as if performing
the task a second time. Hence, consistency with the original
choice may not reﬂect genuine recall, but a consistency in pref-
erence. This is a valid concern, as we have no means of knowing
whether participants indeed recalled or reevaluated. However,
recent ﬁndings indicate that choice blindness manipulations can
shape preferences in favor of the manipulated outcome in a sec-
ond round of choices (i.e., reevaluation; Johansson et al., 2008,
2013; Sauerland et al., 2013b). Importantly, such a shift was
evident for both blind participants and detectors. Hence, we
can make predictions about the outcomes for the reported rat-
ings for cases where participants (a) recalled or reevaluated, (b)
memory is or is not impaired, and (c) participants are blind or
detectors (see Table 1). For example, if our participants sim-
ply reevaluated the faces, a shift in their answers in favor of the
manipulated outcome should be expected, regardless of mem-
ory impairment being a valid explanation for choice blindness
and participants being blind or detectors. If, however, partici-
pants recall – as they were instructed – then blind participants
and detectors should either differ in the reported ratings (i.e.,
impaired memory) or should both favor the original rating (i.e.,
not-impaired memory).
To sum up, according to the memory impairment framework,
the presentation of the manipulated outcome should hinder the
recollection of the original rating. This view implies that partic-
ipants will recall the original rating in the subsequent memory
test more accurately for the non-manipulated compared to the
manipulated trials. Additionally, participants aware of the change
(i.e., detectors) are predicted to be able to discriminate between
the two competing traces (original vs. manipulated) and thus be
better able to recall the original rating than participants blind to
the change. Furthermore, if the memory impairment framework
is correct, blind participants will adopt the manipulated sympa-
thy ratings as their own. Finally, detectors are predicted to display
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Table 1 | Hypothetical outcomes for reported ratings given the


















A total of N = 88 participants (27 men, Mage = 22.3 years,
SDage = 5.0, age range: 18–55) took part in the study. Most of
them were undergraduate psychology students (90.9%), whereas
the remaining participants (9.1%) had various professional back-
grounds. Student participants received course credit in return for
their participation, while for the non-academics no monetary or
other incentives were granted. Participation was voluntary. All
participants were naïve to the purpose of the study and were
tested individually. The study was approved by the standing ethical
committee of the faculty.
STIMULI AND STIMULUS SELECTION
Twenty female facial photos were selected for the sympathy rat-
ing task. All faces were of British or Australian public features
unknown to our participants and were extracted from a data base
kindly provided by R. Jenkins (for full description of technical
characteristics see, Jenkins et al., 2011). Photos showed the faces
in roughly frontal aspect with neutral or smiling facial expression.
Copyright restrictions prevent us from reproducing the images
here. The size of the photos as presented on the computer screen
was 4.5 × 6.5 cm and they were centered in the upper half of the
screen.
To avoid our results being attributed to differences in distinc-
tiveness of the manipulated photos, as the effect of this factor in
choice blindness is not yet examined, we selected three photos to
serve as the to-be-manipulated targets, from the aforementioned
stimulus pool. These had been rated the least distinctive, the most
distinctive and moderately distinctive in a pilot study with 18 par-
ticipants (11 men, Mage = 25.6, SDage = 8.31, age range: 19–48).
These photos depicted Cilla Black (M = 3.9, SD = 2.4), Rachel
Stevens (M = 4.9, SD= 1.7), andCarol Smilie (M = 5.9, SD= 1.7).
Distinctiveness scores for their pictures differ from each other,
all ts(17) ≥ 2.18, ps ≤ 0.058. However, detection did not vary
as a function of distinctiveness, Wald x2s(1, N = 264) = 1.98,
ps ≥ 0.376. We will therefore not discuss this factor any further.
DESIGN
The dependent variables were consistency with the original rating
and consistency with the manipulated outcome. Detection (blind-
ness vs. detection) of the manipulated trials and conﬁdence in the
ability to recall the original sympathy ratings served as the inde-
pendent variables. As a measure of detection we used participants
immediate (i.e., concurrent) apprehension of a change in their
sympathy ratings.
PROCEDURE
All stimuli were presented on a computer screen at a resolution
of 1024 × 768 pixels using Open Sesame display software (Mathôt
et al., 2012). A cover story led participants to believe that the study
was concerned with facial characteristics that make faces more or
less sympathetic. The study consisted of two parts executed in
a single session. During the ﬁrst part, after signing the informed
consent, participants were instructed to rate how sympathetic they
found each of 20 female faces, using a scale ranging from 1 (not
sympathetic at all) to 10 (extremely sympathetic). After a 2 s occlu-
sion time, participants were presented with the picture and the
corresponding sympathy rating again. For half of the presented
faces (i.e., 10) participants were asked to brieﬂy give reasons for
their rating in written. For the remaining faces, participants sim-
ply had to press the space bar to continue. However, in three
of the 10 trials where a justiﬁcation was required, we increased
or decreased participants’ original sympathy ratings by three full
points. For each of the three trials, the manipulation was depen-
dent on participants’ sympathy rating. Speciﬁcally, if participants
provided a rating from 1 to 5, we increased their rating, but if
participants provided a rating from 6 to 10, we decreased their
initial rating. Detection was not affected by the direction of the
manipulation, x2(1, N = 264) = 2.16, p = 0.143, φ = −0.09. If
participants typed a comment indicating that the displayed rating
did not correspond with their own or that the program had made
a mistake, they were classiﬁed as detectors. Detectors frequently
also verbally informed the experimenter about the change i.e., the
“mistake.”
Following the completion of the sympathy rating task par-
ticipants ﬁlled out personality questionnaires as a ﬁller task.
Subsequently, the second part of the study began, in which par-
ticipants were informed that some of their sympathy judgments
had been altered. No information was given as to which speciﬁc
trials or how many of them had been manipulated. Participants’
task was to again view the 10 faces for which they had provided
a motivation earlier and to recall their original sympathy ratings.
Furthermore, participants indicated how conﬁdent they were that
this corresponded with their original rating on an 11-point scale
ranging from 0 to 100%. Subsequently, as in previous studies (e.g.,
Johansson et al., 2005; Hall et al., 2010; Sauerland et al., 2013a,b),
participants received a questionnaire to determine whether they
had detected the manipulations before we disclosed that informa-
tion, but refrained from revealing it while performing the task.
Given that many participants were confused by the structure of
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the questionnaire1, it is doubtful whether the trials reported in the
post-test questionnaire reﬂect genuine detections. Therefore, we
refrain from reporting the questionnaire data. Finally, participants
were thanked and fully debriefed.
RESULTS
CHOICE BLINDNESS
Out of the 88 × 3 = 264 manipulated trials, 107 (40.5%) were
detected. Table 2 shows the detection rates for the three manipu-
lated trials and across all 264 manipulated trials. One could argue
that strictly speaking, choice reversal only occurs when manipu-
lations involve changes crossing the mid-point of the rating scale
(i.e., from “sympathetic” to “not sympathetic,” rather than from
“sympathetic” to “less sympathetic”). Accordingly, we reran the
analysis including only those participants, for which the manipu-
lation resulted in the original choice being shifted to the opposite
half of the Likert scale, leaving 221 trials for analysis. Ninety-one
(41.6%) of these were detected and the pattern results for all sub-
sequent analyses remained largely the same. Therefore, we report
the analyses for the total sample.
MEMORY IMPAIRMENT
To determine whether participants’ ability to remember the orig-
inal ratings was impaired by the performed manipulations, we
ﬁrst compared memory for the sympathy ratings in manipulated
vs. non-manipulated trials. For the non-manipulated trials, par-
ticipants were able to exactly remember their original rating in
45.8% (278 of 607, 95% CI [42.0, 49.0]) of the trials. For the
manipulated trials, that percentage was 46.2% (122 of 264, 95%
CI [40.2, 52.3]). Evidently, there were no differences in par-
ticipants ability to remember their original rating, z = −0.91,
p = 0.91, indicating that blindness is not related to suboptimal
memory.
Next, we examined whether participants would adopt the
manipulated sympathy ratings as their own as a result of impaired
memory of the original choice. Comparisons of participants’ con-
sistency with the manipulated outcome vs. consistency with the
1Participants were asked whether they had detected the manipulation and if so, they
had to specify how many times the manipulation had occurred and which trials
exactly had been manipulated. Unfortunately, we did not include the actual photos
in the post-test questionnaire, an omission that caused confusion in the participants
about which trial referred to which picture. However, only an additional 19 (7.2%)
of the 264 trials were accurately reported in the post-test questionnaire raising the
total detection rate to 47.7% and the pattern of results remained largely the same as
for concurrent detection.
Table 2 | Proportion detection for the three manipulated trials.
Detection
M (%) 95% CI
1st manipulation 35.2 25.0–45.0
2nd manipulation 39.8 29.5–50.0
3rd manipulation 46.6 43.2–64.7
Overall 40.5 38.8–47.0
original rating revealed that participants were much more often
consistent with their original rating than with the manipulated
one, McNemar x2s (1, N = 264) = 101.73, p < 0.001. Speciﬁ-
cally, across the 246 manipulated trials, participants reported the
manipulated outcome in 2.7% of the trials (SD = 16.0, 95% CI
[0.8, 4.9]), while participants were consistent with their original
rating in 46.6% (SD = 49.9, 95% CI [40.2, 52.7]) of the trials.
In the remaining trials (50.8%, SD = 50.1, 95% CI [44.3, 56.8]),
participants were inconsistent with both the manipulated out-
come and the original rating (see Figure 1). Applying a more
liberal consistency criterion, of ±1 scale point2 as equivalent
to the original rating or the manipulated outcome led to sim-
ilar results, McNemar x2(1, N = 264) = 156.49, ps < 0.001.
Speciﬁcally, 9.5% (SD = 29.3, 95% CI [6.1, 13.3]) of the 246
manipulated trials were similar to the manipulated outcome,
while 84.5% (SD = 36.3, 95% CI [79.6, 88.6]) were consis-
tent with the original rating, and 6.1% (SD = 23.9, 95% CI
[3.4, 9.1]) with neither of the trials. Apparently, manipulating
the original sympathy rating did not lead to overall memory
distortion.
Next, we tested the hypothesis that consistencywith the original
rating varies as a function of detection. No support was found for
this assumption, x2(2, N = 264) = 2.38, p = 0.122, φ = 0.09.
Speciﬁcally, consistency with the original sympathy rating was met
in 42.7% (SD = 49.6, 95% CI [35.1, 50.7]) of the non-detected and
in 52.3 % (SD = 50.2, 95% CI [42.9, 61.7]) of the detected trials.
Thus, memory impairment alone, in not a sufﬁcient explanation
for choice blindness phenomena.
In light of these ﬁndings, we wondered whether our manip-
ulations had any effect on participants recall ability. To test this,
we computed the deviation between the remembered and partic-
ipants’ original sympathy ratings (i.e., Consistency = rating time
2 – rating time 1) as a continuous measure of consistency with
the original rating. Our aim was to examine whether this alter-
native approach would reveal differences in recall ability between
manipulated andnon-manipulated trials. Twooutlierswith adevi-
ation of ﬁve scale points from the original choice were excluded.
A paired sample t-test showed that the mean distance between
the recalled and the original sympathy rating was greater for
manipulated (M = 0.53, SD = 0.49, 95% CI [0.43, 0.64]) than
non-manipulated trials (M = 0.27, SD = 0.22, 95% CI [0.22,
0.31]), t(85) = 4.59, p < 0.001. Additionally, the direction of the
change from participants’ original to their remembered estimate
was consistent with the direction of the manipulation (although
it did not affect the distance between participants’ original and
remembered estimate, t(260) = 1.75, p = 0.080). Figure 2 dis-
plays the mean distance from the original sympathy ratings for
increase (n = 123) and decrease (n = 141) manipulations. As can
be seen, the manipulations affected participants’ recollections.
Following a similar approach, we next examined whether this
continuous measure of consistency would reveal differences in
recall ability between detected and non-detected trials. Hence, we
performed general equations estimates (GEE) analyses with con-
sistency with the original sympathy estimate as dependent variable
2This is equal to roughly one SD difference in consistency with the original rating
(SD = 0.89) and the manipulated choice (SD = 1.07).
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FIGURE 1 | Proportion of trials consistent with the original sympathy rating, the manipulated outcome, and neither of after the application of a
conservative or lenient (±1 scale point variance) criterion. Error bars represent 95% conﬁdence intervals.
FIGURE 2 | Mean distance from the original sympathy rating as a
function of manipulation direction (increase vs. decrease). Error bars
represent 95% conﬁdence intervals.
and detection (blindness vs. detection) as predictor. However, no
signiﬁcant results emerged,Wald x2(1, N = 262) = 2.7, p = 0.141.
Figure 3 displays the mean distance from the original sympathy
ratings as a function of detection. Finally, we tested whether the
distance from the original sympathy ratingwould be greater for the
non-detected compared with the detected trials among the incon-
sistent with the original rating cases (N = 139). No support was
found for this assumption,Wald x2(1,N = 139) = 0.20, p = 0.652.
Speciﬁcally, the mean distance from the original sympathy rating
FIGURE 3 | Mean distance from the original sympathy rating as a
function of detection (detected vs. non-detected). Error bars represent
95% conﬁdence intervals.
for the non-detected trials wasM = 1.45 (SD = 0.76, 95%CI [1.30,
1.63]) and for the detected trials was M = 1.39 (SD = 0.85, 95%
CI [1.18, 1.63]). Evidently, memory impairment is not sufﬁcient
for choice blindness to occur.
CONFIDENCE AS POSTDICTOR OF CONSISTENCY
The ﬁnal set of analyses tested whether conﬁdence in recall
ability, along with detection, can postdict consistency with the
original sympathy rating. We performed GEE analyses with
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consistency with the original sympathy estimate as dependent
variable and detection (blindness vs. detection) and conﬁ-
dence as predictors. In 14 trials, no conﬁdence rating was
provided leaving 250 trials for analysis. The interaction effect
between detection and conﬁdence was not signiﬁcant, Wald x2(1,
N = 250) = 2.80, p = 0.094. The model without the inter-
action term returned no signiﬁcant effect for detection, Wald
x2(1, N = 250) = 0.621, p = 0.431, but revealed a signiﬁ-
cant conﬁdence effect. After deleting detection from the model,
conﬁdence attained signiﬁcance, Wald x2(1, N = 250) = 9.33,
p = 0.002. Speciﬁcally, higher conﬁdence ratings were associated
with higher consistency with the original choice. Thus, conﬁdence
seemed to be a reliable predictor of consistency with the original
rating. Figure 4 presents the conﬁdence ratings for all manipu-
lated trials that are consistent or inconsistent with the original
rating.
Using the continuous measure of consistency led to compara-
ble results. Speciﬁcally, neither the interaction between detection
and conﬁdence, Wald x2(1, N = 249) = 0.93, p = 0.334, nor the
main effect of detection (after deletion of the interaction effect)
was signiﬁcant,Wald x2(1,N = 250) = 0.602, p = 0.438. The main
effect of conﬁdence indicated that high conﬁdence was associated
with little deviation from the original rating, while lower conﬁ-
dence was associated with stronger deviations from the original
rating, Wald x2(1, N = 249) = 5.96, p = 0.015. Figure 5 displays
mean conﬁdence across the observed distances from the original
rating.
DISCUSSION
The aim of the current study was to test whether choice blind-
ness is a result of memory impairment of the original trace. To
our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst study that directly examined this
issue. Drawing on thememory impairment framework (Fischhoff,
FIGURE 4 | Confidence as a function of consistency with the original
sympathy rating for all manipulated trials. Error bars represent 95%
conﬁdence intervals.
FIGURE 5 | Confidence as a function of the deviation from the original
sympathy rating for detected and non-detected trials. Error bars
represent 95% conﬁdence intervals.
1975; Loftus and Hoffman, 1989), we predicted that participants
would have difﬁculties in remembering their original sympathy
rating after confrontation with a manipulated rating and that they
would adopt the manipulated outcome as their own. Contrary to
this assumption, the vast majority of the participants gave sympa-
thy ratings that were consistent with their original choice. Further,
there were no differences between detectors and blind partici-
pants in their ability to reproduce their original ratings. This was
true when consistency with the original ratings was expressed in
dichotomous terms, but also while being indexed in a continuous
fashion. Althoughparticipantswere affected by the direction of the
manipulation, the distance between the recalled and the original
sympathy rating did not differ among detected and non-detected
trials. Furthermore, participants’ conﬁdence in their ability to
remember the original sympathy rating was a reliable postdictor
of consistency.
Despite the fact that choice blindness can occur in the absence
of memory impairment, the current study allows for other impor-
tant observations. First, our results provide further evidence for
the robustness of the choice blindness effect (e.g., Johansson et al.,
2008; Hall et al., 2010; Sauerland et al., 2013a). Second, our ﬁnd-
ings are comparable with the broader misinformation literature
which shows that post hoc misinformation often distorts memory
(for a review, see Loftus and Hoffman, 1989; Payne et al., 1994;
Ayers and Reder, 1998). Evidently, there were differences in the
remembered sympathy rating between manipulated and non-
manipulated trials and participants were largely affected by the
direction of the manipulation (see Figure 2). The fact that con-
sistency with the original sympathy rating was not associated with
the capacity to detect a manipulation though, speaks to the idea
that distorted memory is not necessary for choice blindness to
occur.
Third, the current study is informative as it demonstrates
with a direct test that blindness phenomena cannot be attributed
to impaired memory of the initial memory trace or memory
decay. Speciﬁcally, in a substantial number of trials (123 of
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264; 46.6%), participants were able to remember their original
rating with precision. This supports the idea that the memory
trace for the original rating was still accessible and could be
retrieved at will. These ﬁndings support earlier indications that
blindness phenomena cannot be reduced to weak memory or
forgetting (Sagana et al., 2013). Over and above when partici-
pants did change their ratings (53.4% of trials), the shift in the
answers from the original sympathy ratings to the subsequently
remembered sympathy estimates was independent of whether
a manipulation was detected or not. Thus, even when partic-
ipants were aware of the change in their judgments, they had
limited capacity to segregate the inﬂuence of the manipulation
from the recall process. This replicates earlier ﬁndings showing
that participants shift their answers in favor of the originally non-
preferred alternative when asked to perform a second round of
choices (Johansson et al., 2008; Hall et al., 2013; Sauerland et al.,
2013b). These studies and our ﬁndings are consistent with work
demonstrating that there are conditions in which choices precede
preferences (rather than vice versa; see studies by Sharot et al.,
2009, 2010).
Further, our results demonstrate that conﬁdence is a reli-
able postdictor of consistency with the original sympathy rating.
Hence, the present ﬁndings indicate the informative value of
conﬁdence as a postdictor of the accuracy of estimates provided
following a manipulated outcome; that is, following incorrect
information about one’s own decision. Considering that to date
we only have limited understanding of the mechanism con-
tributing to choice blindness – and thus incapable of offering
methods for its reversal – the postdictive value of conﬁdence
might be beneﬁcial for establishing the accuracy of a remembered
choice.
Turning to the limitations of the present study, as already dis-
cussed in the introduction participants may not have engaged
actively in retrieval, but rather may have provided a sympathy
estimate as if they were asked to perform the same task a second
time. However, the fact that both blind participants and detectors
were consistent with the original rating speaks to the idea that par-
ticipants, indeed, recalled their original rating instead of simply
performing the task a second time (see Table 1). Furthermore, our
procedure was largely parallel with that is typically done to eval-
uate memory for past decisions in hindsight bias literature (e.g.,
Hoffrage et al., 2000; Sanna and Schwarz, 2003; Pohl, 2007). Nev-
ertheless, the contributions of retrieval vs. preferential consistency
should be addressed more directly in future research. Another lim-
itation is that the post-test questionnaire was handed out at the
end of the experiment, after participants were informed about
the manipulations. This made it difﬁcult to derive retrospective
detection rates. Additionally, the absence of the actual stimulus
photos in the post-test questionnaire was a source of confusion.
Future research should consider administering the post-test ques-
tionnaire before the recall task and including photos of the stimuli
instead of verbal descriptions.
To summarize, this study has shown that memory impair-
ment is not sufﬁcient prerequisite for choice blindness to occur.
Instead, our ﬁndings indicate a complex mechanism responsible
for choice blindness that allows a fairly accurate recollection of the
original choice but yet disables the detection of a manipulation.
This arguably hints in the direction of a subtle malfunction in
recognition. One way to test this interpretation is to examine dif-
ferences in neuronal activity while participants perform a typical
choice blindness paradigm and a subsequent recognition task. We
acknowledge though that developing a choice blindness paradigm
which permits the collection of neural data may be difﬁcult, given
that fMRI and ERP measures require a number of repetitive trials
which in itself may introduce artefacts. An alternative explanation,
however, is that participants are involved in a self-persuasion pro-
cess (Johansson et al., 2011). Endorsing choices suggestedbyothers
may generate a degree of cognitive dissonance, which people want
to overcome (Festinger, 1962; Henkel and Mather, 2007). There-
fore, participants confabulate introspective arguments to convince
themselves about the assumed choice. Hence, they fail to detect the
manipulated outcome but are able to recall their original choice
when the dissonance is resolved by the revelation that the choice
had been manipulated.
CONCLUSION
We believe that the results provide interesting insights for under-
standing choice blindness, with the major ﬁnding being that
forgetting is not an exhaustive explanation for the phenomenon.
Hence, to grasp the fundamentals of choice blindness, we may
better consider Baddeley’s (1988) question: “What the hell is it
for?”Therefore,we suggest that future research should focus on the
function of blindness phenomena when answering the question
about why they occur at all in everyday life.
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